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Abstract
In this essay, I argue about the relevance and the ulti-
mate unity of the Bayesian approach in a neutral and
agnostic manner. My main theme is that Bayesian
data analysis is an effective tool for handling com-
plex models, as proven by the increasing proportion
of Bayesian studies in the applied sciences. I thus dis-
regard the philosophical debates on the meaning of
probability and on the random nature of parameters
as things of the past that ultimately do a disservice to
the approach and are irrelevant to most bystanders.
Keywords: Bayesian inference, Bayes model choice,
foundations, testing, non-informative prior, Bayes
factor, computational statistics
1 Introduction
Bayesian data analysis can be defined as a method for
summarising uncertainty and making estimates and
predictions using probability statements conditional
on observed data and an assumed model (Gelman
2008). In this essay, I aim to explain why I believe
(with many others) that Bayesian data analysis is
valuable and useful in statistics, econometrics, and
biostatistics, among other fields. My defence of the
theme is based on presenting a user’s perspective and
arguing in favour of the ultimate practicality of the
Bayesian toolbox, whilst refraining from more elabo-
rate philosophical and epistemological arguments on
∗C.P. Robert is Professor of Statistics at Uni-
versite´ Paris-Dauphine, CEREMADE, Paris, France,
and Head of the Statistics Lab at CREST, Paris
Email: xian@ceremade.dauphine.fr Webpage:
xianblog.wordpress.com
the nature of Science.
I do agree with Russell Davidson that the shrill
tone of some—mostly past—defences of the Bayesian
paradigm are doing it a disservice by transferring the
debate to religious and therefore irrational grounds.1
My personal stance on the Bayesian choice is on the
contrary grounded in realism. The Bayesian perspec-
tive provides me with a complete toolbox that allows
me to conduct inference in an arbitrary setting at a
minimal cost in terms of constructing statistical pro-
cedures. In addition, it provides sufficient theoreti-
cal safety rails to ensure coherence in my decision-
making and convergence properties for my proce-
dures. I also agree with Andrew Gelman’s (2008)
reservation that a consequence of Bayesian statistics
being given a proper name is that it encourages too
much historical deference from people who think that
the bibles of Jeffreys, de Finetti, or Jaynes have all
the answers. The formalisation of Bayesian statis-
tics by those pioneers has greatly contributed towards
more efficiency in the design of Bayesian procedures
(Robert et al. 2009) and therefore to their current
popularity. However, naming a technique after par-
ticular scientists, even when as prestigious as those
above, is a rhetorical trick to bring more authority
to an approach. To keep the tone of this essay as
clear as possible, I will nonetheless use the recent
(Fienberg 2006) adjective of “Bayesian” in the fol-
lowing but I will mostly refrain from giving a name
to alternatives, the usual adjective of “frequentists”
seeming now out-dated and overly restrictive. The
1The barb of Russell Davidson, also found in Senn (2008),
Bayesians are of course their own worst enemies. They make
non-Bayesians accuse them of religious fervour, and an un-
willingness to see another point of view, is not completely un-
founded.
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range of non-Bayesian statistical techniques indeed
extends much further than looking at average prop-
erties.
As already done in the above, throughout the text
I will be making (an admittedly selective) use of re-
cent quotes that defend or criticise the Bayesian ap-
proach. Most of them emanate from a debate run
by Bayesian Analysis following the tongue-in-cheek
critique of Gelman (2008). I will present here ele-
ments to support Gelman’s (2008) conclusion that,
given the advances in practical Bayesian methods in
the past two decades, anti-Bayesianism is no longer
a serious option. My view is that denying the rele-
vance of Bayesian analysis on the sole ground that it
is Bayesian does not follow from a rational stance.
2 Bayesian models
Let me first stress that the Bayesian approach
to non-parametrics is alive and well, as shown
for instance by the recent advances in Dirich-
let models (Teh et al. 2006) and Bayesian asymp-
totics (Ghosal and Van der Vaart 2006) (see also
Hjort et al. 2009). Bayesian non-parametrics can
now manage density and functional estimation with
the same degree of complexity with which a nor-
mal mean is estimated by a Bayesian analysis based
on a conjugate prior (Holmes et al. 2002). As re-
gards Russell Davidson’s first question related to the
Bahadur-Savage impossibility theorem, I do not un-
derstand the statistical point of the test in his Sec-
tion 3 and I therefore have no answer. (His Theo-
rem 1 reminds me very much of a result of the late
Costas Goutis, reported in my book, Robert 2001,
Table 3.2.3, about the range of Bayes estimators.) On
the other hand, the issue raised by Russell Davidson
in Section 7 about incorporating smoothness in the
prior does not seem to be particularly problematic,
once smoothness is defined in terms of a particular
class of functions.
I will only consider here parametric settings,
mostly for simplicity and space reasons. (And also
for the fact that the priors found in non-parametric
settings seem to be much more acceptable as work-
ing tools by non-Bayesians.) The common ground
for both parametric and non-parametric settings is
nonetheless that a model provides a likelihood. I
simply do not believe meaningful inference is possible
without this likelihood function.2
Given that all models are approximations of the
real world, the choice of a parametric model obvi-
ously is wide-open to criticism. As stated by Gelman
(2008), Bayesians promote the idea that a multiplicity
of parameters can be handled via hierarchical, typ-
ically exchangeable, models, but it seems implausi-
ble that this could really work automatically [instead
of] giving reasonable answers using minimal assump-
tions. This is, however, a type of criticism that goes
beyond Bayesian modelling per se and questions the
relevance of completely built models for drawing in-
ference or running predictions. (Obviously, embrac-
ing my “opponent’s” perspective that inference is
sometimes impossible would immediately close the
discussion!) The Bayesian paradigm does not state
that the model with which it operates is the “truth”,
no more than it requires that the corresponding prior
distribution has a connection with the “true” pro-
duction of parameters (since there may even be no
parameter at all). It simply provides an inferential
machine that has strong optimality properties under
the right model and that can similarly be evaluated
under any other well-defined alternative models. In
Popper’s (1934) terms, a Bayesian model can be “fal-
sified” when faced with data from another model.3
Templeton (2008) sees the fact that having a high
relative [posterior] probability does not mean that a
hypothesis is true or supported by the data as the
ultimate drawback of the Bayesian paradigm. On
the contrary, I see it as a strength, even in Poppe-
rian terms, because (a) there is no such thing as a
2Of course, this statement goes against a large portion of
the current practice that contends that first moments are suf-
ficient descriptions of the real world. But I do prefer the fa-
cilities provided by a full if wrong model to the adhocqueries
required by a minimalist modelling. In particular, replying to
Russell Davidson’s question in Section 4, I do not think there
is a Bayesian approach to GMM’s unless one is ready to use a
pseudo-likelihood that encompasses the specified moments.
3This is not to imply that the philosophy of Popper
(1934) is in agreement with the Bayesian approach, since
Popper and Miller (1983) demonstrates the impossibility of co-
herent statistical inference.
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“true” hypothesis and (b) the support brought by the
data is always relative to a reference model. Besides,
the Bayesian approach is such that techniques allow
prior beliefs to be tested and discarded as appropriate
(Gelman 2008). In other words, Bayesian data anal-
ysis has three stages: formulating a model, fitting the
model to data, and checking the model fit (Gelman
2008). Hence, there seems to be little reason for not
using a parametric model at an early stage even if it
is later dismissed as “not true enough” (in favour of
another model).
Besides giving the Bayesian paradigm his name,
Thomas Bayes contributed by stating the definition
of a conditional probability and deriving what is now
known as Bayes theorem.4 Nonetheless, if surpris-
ingly, there still exists a debate about the very nature
of Bayes theorem. Russell Davidson points out that
it is difficult to express it in the formalism that is
used in financial economics/econometrics. Another
illustration is given by Templeton (2008). He argues
that conditioning upon the observation x ∼ f(x|θ) is
plainly invalid: The impact of treating x as a fixed
constant is to increase statistical power as an arte-
fact and ignoring the sampling error of x undermines
the statistical validity of all inferences made by the
method. As validated by standard measure theory
(Billingsley 1986), the posterior distribution
π(θ|x) =
f(x|θ)π(θ)∫
f(x|θ)π(θ) dθ
does include the sampling (or error) distribution
while conditioning on the data x. This approach fur-
thermore is the only coherent way to give a meaning
to statements like P(θ > 0|x), i.e. to properly con-
struct confidence and prediction statements, while
conditioning on the data at hand.5
4As stressed by Jaynes (2003), Bayes’ contribution to in-
ference was essentially restricted to a somewhat dubious toy
example of locating the position of a billiard ball. In con-
trast, Laplace and others had a much wider range of exam-
ples, with more realistic applications. Jeffreys, de Finetti and
Jaynes set the bases into firmer mathematical and methodolog-
ical ground, while Wald and Stein established the fundamental
optimality properties validating Bayes procedures.
5This point relates to Russell Davidson’s questions about
the bootstrap. While I appreciate very much the strength of
Gelman (2008) reports that Bayesian methods are
presented as an automatic inference engine, and this
raises suspicion in anyone with applied experience. It
is true that π(θ|x) is the core of Bayesian inference. It
can legitimately be viewed as the “ultimate inference
engine” via which all decisions (in a decision-theoretic
framework) based on the data can be automatically
derived. There is no fundamental difficulty in this
automated derivation.6 Once optimality criteria are
explicitly stated via the utility function associated
with the decision, searching for the optimal decision
reduces to solving a well-posed optimisation prob-
lem.7 Furthermore, the inference [step] gets most of
the attention, but the Bayesian procedure as a whole
is not automatic (Gelman 2008). In addition, using a
probability distribution on the parameter space and
Bayes theorem allows for a coherent update of the in-
formation available on θ in the sense that the current
posterior distribution becomes the prior distribution
before gathering more data.
3 On prior selection
The recurrent criticism of the Bayesian perspective is
that the whole inferential approach is ultimately de-
pendent upon the choice of the prior distribution, as
clearly shown by the definition of the posterior dis-
tribution above. There is no possible debate about
bootstrapping techniques and find them a natural entry to
Statistics for my third year students, I have trouble recon-
ciliating the bootstrap and Bayesian statistics. Indeed, the
bootstrap is fundamentally a plug-in method, especially in its
parametric version, which therefore omits to properly take into
account the variability of the plugged-in parameter estimates.
6That it is an automatic engine is an argument rarely ad-
vanced by critics of the Bayesian approach, who on the con-
trary uniformly point out its subjective features. See Section
3.
7Gelman (2008) stresses that loss functions [are] not rel-
evant to statistical inference and he does not see any role
for squared error loss, minimax, or the rest of what is some-
times called statistical decision theory. Following the argu-
ments advanced in Robert (2001), but also in Berger (1985)
and Bernardo and Smith (1994), I cannot but strongly dis-
agree with this perspective. Decision theory is a strong moti-
vation for using Bayesian procedures, especially in economics
and econometrics where rationality is customarily associated
with maximising utility functions.
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this fact, either from a mathematical or methodolog-
ical perspective. It is also straightforward to come
up with examples where the choice of the prior leads
to absurd decisions.
There is no easy answer to this criticism, but this
acknowledgement must not be taken as conceding de-
feat in the debate! If the prior had no impact on the
inference, data would be similarly useless, since the
update would not matter. Therefore, I see this de-
pendence as a plus of the Bayesian approach. It al-
lows one to include an infinite range of prior opinions
and items of information, while progressively concen-
trating on neighbourhoods of the “true” value of the
parameter—in settings where the data is generated
from the assumed model. In the literature, this point
about the advantages of incorporating prior informa-
tion is rather universally accepted. The criticisms
instead focus on the opposite situation where the
prior information is poor or inexistent, denying non-
informative (or ignorance) priors their label, i.e. the
representation of a state of complete ignorance.
Maybe surprisingly (and maybe not!), I completely
agree with this criticism in that any choice of prior
distribution corresponds to some informational input
about the parameter. The ultimate argument is that,
were there such a thing as the non-informative prior,
it would be expected to represent total ignorance about
the problem (Kass and Wasserman 1996). Thus, be-
ing moderately unfair (!), this object should be such
an information black hole as to cancel the effect of
any amount of information and should thus remain
the same even after observing the data! Therefore,
when Jeffreys (1939) states that if the parameter may
have any value from −∞ to +∞, its prior probability
should be taken as uniformly distributed, he is making
a choice of a particular structure of the model that
impacts on his future inference, in addition to using
the term uniform in an implicitly generalised man-
ner because the parameter space is then unbounded
(Robert et al. 2009). Instead, as stated by Gelman
(2008), there is no good objective principle for choos-
ing a noninformative prior (even if that concept were
mathematically defined, which it is not). The notions
of objective and of non-informative are indeed not
well-defined mathematical concepts and they carry
an irrational undertone that fails to lend legitimacy
to the associated priors. Some mathematical criteria
do lead to some competing families of reference pri-
ors like the left Haar measures mentioned by Russell
Davidson or matching priors (see Robert 2001, Chap-
ters 3 and 8). The ultimate attempt at producing
a meaningful rationale for building non-informative
priors is, in my opinion, Bernardo’s (1979) defini-
tion through the information theoretical device of
Kullback divergence (see also Berger and Bernardo
1992). Quite obviously, this is not the only possi-
ble approach. Among other things, it depends on
a choice of information measure, does not always
lead to a solution and requires an ordering of the
model parameters that involves some prior informa-
tion (or some subjective choice). However, as long
as we do not think of those reference priors as rep-
resenting ignorance (Lindley 1971), they can indeed
be taken as reference priors, upon which everyone
could fall back when the prior information is missing
(Kass and Wasserman 1996).
Apart from the conceptual confusion about non-
informative priors that plagued most of the 19th
and mid 20th century debate about the nature of
Bayesian inference, the issue of improper priors often
serves as a further criticism. Indeed, non-informative
priors often are measurable functions π(θ) with infi-
nite mass, ∫
Θ
π(θ) dθ = +∞ ,
which deprives them of a probabilistic interpretation.
This criticism can be most easily rebutted for a wide
variety of reasons. The first reason is topological co-
herence: limits of Bayesian procedures often partake
of their optimality properties (Wald 1950) and should
therefore be included in the range of possible proce-
dures. Another one is robustness: a measure with an
infinite mass is much more robust than a true prob-
ability distribution with a large variance. Provided
∫
Θ
f(x|θ)π(θ) dθ <∞ ,
the quantity
π(θ|x) =
f(x|θ)π(θ)∫
Θ
f(x|θ)π(θ) dθ
4
is as well-defined as a probability density as a regular
posterior distribution (Hartigan 1983, Berger 1985,
Robert 2001).
4 Testing versus model com-
parison
The inferential problems of Bayesian model selec-
tion and of Bayesian testing are clearly those for
which the most vigorous criticisms can be found in
the literature. An illustration is provided by Senn
(2008) who states that the Jeffreys-subjective synthe-
sis betrays a much more dangerous confusion than the
Neyman-Pearson-Fisher synthesis as regards hypoth-
esis tests. I find this suspicion rather intriguing given
that the Bayesian approach is the only one giving a
proper meaning to the probability of a null hypothe-
sis, P(H0|x). Alternative methodologies are able, at
best, to specify a probability value on the sampling
space, i.e. on the “wrong” space since the only vari-
ation is on the parameter space once the observation
is obtained.
Senn (2008) further advances that what is almost
never used, however, is the Jeffreys significance test.
I recall here that the most standard Bayesian ap-
proach to testing and model choice relies on the Bayes
factor (Kass and Raftery 1995), which, for hypothe-
ses written as H0 : θ ∈ Θ0 and as H1 : θ ∈ Θ1, is
defined as (Jeffreys 1939, Jaynes 2003)
B01 =
π(Θ0|x)
π(Θ1|x)
/
π(Θ0)
π(Θ1)
=
∫
Θ0
f(x|θ)π0(θ)dθ∫
Θ1
f(x|θ)π1(θ)dθ
.
This monotonic transform of the posterior probabil-
ity of H0 eliminates the influence of the prior weight
π(Θ0) and has a similar interpretation to the classical
likelihood ratio. However, it does not suffer from the
over-fitting difficulties of the latter, in that it includes
a natural penalisation factor for richer models. This
is shown by the connection with the BIC (Bayesian
information criterion), intuited by Jeffreys (1939):
variation is random until the contrary is shown; and
new parameters in laws, when they are suggested,
must be tested one at a time, unless there is specific
reason to the contrary. Although I strongly dislike
using the term because of its undeserved weight of
academic authority, the Bayes factor acts as a natu-
ral Ockham’s razor.
A criticism of the use of Bayes factors (e.g.,
Templeton 2008) is that the quantity is not scaled
in probability terms. On the contrary, I maintain it
is naturally scaled against one and can, moreover, be
readily transformed into posterior probabilities when
the prior probabilities of the hypotheses are speci-
fied. (It is furthermore a natural factor in a decision-
theoretic framework, see Robert 2001.) Another crit-
icism is rarely voiced outside the Bayesian commu-
nity, namely that the use of improper priors is mostly
prohibited in this setting, for lack of proper normal-
ising constants. Solutions have been proposed, akin
to cross-validation techniques in the classical domain
(Berger and Pericchi 1996, Berger et al. 1998), but
they are somehow too ad-hoc to convince the entire
community (and obviously beyond).
If we consider the special case of point null
hypotheses—which is not so limited in scope since
it includes all variable selection setups—, there is a
difficulty with using a standard prior in this environ-
ment. As put by Jeffreys (1939), when considering
whether a location parameter α is 0 [when] the prior
is uniform, we should have to take π(α) = 0 and B10
would always be infinite. This is a case when the in-
ferential question implies a modification of the prior,
justified by the information contained in the ques-
tion. Avoiding the whole issue is a clear-cut solution,
as with Gelman (2008) having no patience for statis-
tical methods that assign positive probability to point
hypotheses of the θ = 0 type that can never actually
be true. Considering the null and the alternative hy-
potheses as defining two different models is another
solution that allows for a Bayes factor representation.
A major criticism directed at the Bayesian ap-
proach to testing is that it is not interpretable on
the same scale as the Neyman-Pearson-Fisher solu-
tion, namely in terms of Type I error probability
and test power. In other words, frequentist methods
have coverage guarantees; Bayesian methods don’t;
95 percent frequentist intervals will live up to their
advertised coverage claims (Wasserman 2008). A nat-
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ural thing to do is then to question the appeal of
such frequentist properties when considering a single
dataset. That is, in Jeffreys’ (1939) famous words, a
hypothesis that may be true may be rejected because
it had not predicted observable results that have not
occurred. From a decision-theoretic perspective—to
which the frequentist properties should relate—, a
classical Neyman-Pearson-Fisher procedure is never
evaluated in terms of the consequences of rejecting
the null hypothesis, even though the rejection must
imply a subsequent action towards the choice of an al-
ternative model. (From a narrower decision-theoretic
perspective, note also that p-values may be inadmis-
sible estimators, Hwang et al. 1992.) Therefore, ar-
guing that high posteriors probabilities do not imply
that a hypothesis is true as in Templeton (2008) and
that the Bayesian approach is relative in that it posits
two or more alternative hypotheses and tests their
relative fits to some observed statistics (Templeton
2008), is missing the main purpose of Bayesian tests.
Bayesian procedures do not aim at validating or in-
validating a golden model per se but rather lead to
the choice of a working model that allows for accept-
able predictive properties.8
Another criticism covers the lack of asymmetry of
the Bayes factor, since it satisfies the equality B10 =
1/B01. For model choice, i.e. when several models
are under comparison for the same observation
Mi : x ∼ fi(x|θi) , i ∈ I ,
where I can be finite or infinite, this symmetry seems
to me to be a fundamentally sound property. Never-
theless, Templeton (2008) bemoans that there is no
null hypothesis, which complicates the computation
of sampling error, since there is no single statistical
model under which to evaluate sampling. This should
be construed as a clear limitation of the Neyman-
Pearson-Fisher paradigm, since the latter imposes
asymmetry and (Type I) error control under a sin-
gle (null) model. However, this is not the perspective
of Templeton (2008) who concludes with the impos-
8It is worth repeating the earlier assertion that all models
are false and that finding that a hypothesis is “true” is not
within our reach, if at all meaningful!
sibility of the posterior probability of a model,
π(Mi|x) =
pi
∫
Θi
fi(x|θi)πi(θi)dθi
∑
j
pj
∫
Θj
fj(x|θj)πj(θj)dθj
due to the impression that the numerators are not
co-measurable across hypotheses, and the denomina-
tors are sums of non-co-measurable entities. Hence,
the “posterior probabilities” that emerge are not co-
measurable. This means that it is mathematically im-
possible for them to be probabilities. Given that all
terms are marginal likelihoods for the same obser-
vation, it seems difficult to argue against their co-
measurability. Contrary to classical plug-in likeli-
hoods, marginal likelihoods do allow for a comparison
on the same scale. Similarly, the belief that compli-
cating dimensionality of test statistics is the fact that
the models are often not nested, and one model may
contain parameters that do not have analogues in the
other models and vice versa (Templeton 2008) is not
well-founded. The Bayes factor is properly defined
and applicable to settings where the models are not
embedded (or nested). This is due to the fact that the
corresponding quantity of interest for a given model
is the marginal likelihood (or evidence), which inte-
grates over spaces and complexity and which can be
interpreted at face value since it is calibrated across
models.
A last point of contention about Bayesian testing
is the apparent absence of clearly defined directions
when conducting a standard analysis. Figure 1 re-
produces an output from Marin and Robert (2007b).
This computer output illustrates how a default prior
and Bayes factors can be used in the same spirit
as significance levels in a standard regression model,
each Bayes factor being associated with the test of
the nullity of the corresponding regression coefficient.
This output mimics the standard R function lm out-
come in order to show that the level of information
provided by the Bayesian analysis goes beyond the
classical output. My point here is obviously not in
showing that we can get similar answers to those of
a least square analysis since, else, we might as well
use the frequentist method (Wasserman 2008). It is
6
Estimate BF log10(BF)
(Intercept) 9.2714 26.334 1.4205 (***)
X1 -0.0037 7.0839 0.8502 (**)
X2 -0.0454 3.6850 0.5664 (**)
X3 0.0573 0.4356 -0.3609
X4 -1.0905 2.8314 0.4520 (*)
X5 0.1953 2.5157 0.4007 (*)
X6 -0.3008 0.3621 -0.4412
X7 -0.2002 0.3627 -0.4404
X8 0.1526 0.4589 -0.3383
X9 -1.0835 0.9069 -0.0424
X10 -0.3651 0.4132 -0.3838
evidence against H0: (****) decisive, (***) strong, (**)
substantial, (*) poor
Figure 1: R output of a Bayesian regression on a
processionary caterpillar dataset with ten covariates
analysed in Marin and Robert (2007b).
to demonstrate that reference analyses are available,
while preserving the strength of the Bayesian machin-
ery (like joint confidence regions and multiple tests).
5 On pervasive computing
Bayesian analysis has long been derided for pro-
viding optimal answers that could not be com-
puted. With the advent of early Monte Carlo meth-
ods, of personal computers, and, more recently,
of more powerful Monte Carlo methods (Hitchcock
2003), the pendulum appears to have switched to
the other extreme. Nowadays, Bayesian meth-
ods seem to quickly move to elaborate computa-
tion (Gelman 2008). This feature does not make
Bayesian methods less suspicious in the mind of crit-
ics, for different reasons: a simulation method of
inference hides unrealistic assumptions (Templeton
2008). I won’t launch here into a defence of sim-
ulation techniques that have done so much to pro-
mote Bayesian analysis in the past decades, referring
to Chen et al. (2000), Robert and Casella (2004),
Marin and Robert (2007b) for detailed arguments
and to Robert and Marin (2010), Robert and Wraith
(2009) for specific coverages of the computational ad-
vances related to Bayesian model choice. Simulation
methods can certainly be misused—as any method-
ology can be—. However, while Bayesian simulation
[may seem] stuck in an infinite regress of inferential
uncertainty (Gelman 2008), there exist enough con-
vergence assessment techniques (Robert and Casella
2010) to ensure a reasonable degree of confidence in
the accuracy of the approximation provided by those
simulation methods. Thus, as rightly stressed by
Bernardo (2008), the discussion of computational is-
sues should not be allowed to obscure the need for
further analysis of inferential questions.9
In Section 6, Russell Davidson asks about the reli-
ability of Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) meth-
ods and about recent developments in this field. The
answer is more complex than time and space allow
in this essay, so my first reply is to refer him to
(Robert and Casella 2004, 2009) for booklength en-
tries. A second response is that, despite their specific
label, MCMC methods do not differ in essence from
other Monte Carlo methods. When using an impor-
tance sampler or an harmonic mean estimator (see
Marin and Robert 2007a for details), the quantities
we produce are unbiased, which is not a characteristic
of MCMC outputs. However, they may also be asso-
ciated with infinite variance, which means that their
convergence time is beyond anyone’s patience! The
same applies to MCMC samples which are formally
associated with the correct stationary distribution
but which may in practice end up with a cosmological
number of iterations! Robert and Casella (2010) de-
tails several tools that help in checking convergence
and stationarity, but those tools are not completely
foolproof. Therefore it may happen that the lack of
convergence of a MCMC output remains undetected.
Similarly, using a numerical integration software may
fail to detect an important region for the integrand.
Those are numerical problems that have little to do
with the methodology under scrutiny and can often
9The confusion of Templeton (2008) is of this nature,
namely his criticisms bear in fact on the generic principles of
Bayesian inference and in particular testing while he aims at
criticising a specific simulation methodology called ABC and
described below. See Beaumont et al. (2010) for a discussion
of this confusion.
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be detected by using a multifaceted strategy, mixing
together several numerical methods.
Interestingly enough, the most accurate—in our
opinion—approximation technique for Bayes factors
is, when applicable, derived from Bayes theorem,
This is indeed the purpose of Chib’s (1995) rendering:
m(x) =
π(θ)f(x|θ)
π(θ|x)
≈
π(θ)f(x|θ)
πˆ(θ|x)
,
where πˆ(θ|x) is a simulation-based approximation to
the posterior density. Marin and Robert (2008) pro-
pose an illustration in the setting of mixtures, while
Robert and Marin (2010) implement the method for
a probit model, with both examples demonstrating
the precision of this approximation, There have been
discussions about the accuracy of this method in
multimodal settings (Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter 2004), but
straightforward modifications (Berkhof et al. 2003,
Lee et al. 2008) overcome such difficulties and make
for both an easy and a robust computational tool as-
sociated with Bayes factors.
Instead of presenting the whole range of available
computational solutions, I want to point out here
a single but recent advance in Bayesian computing
that allows for a further extension of Bayesian data
analysis to cases where any other method of infer-
ence is either impossible or seriously inaccurate. This
new method is called ABC, standing for Approxi-
mate Bayesian Computation. It was introduced in
genomics by Pritchard et al. (1999) to handle mod-
els, like phylogenic trees, where the likelihood could
not be computed in a reasonable time, hence pro-
hibiting the use of standard simulation tools. The
method is based on a standard accept-reject princi-
ple generating θ ∼ π(θ), x′ ∼ f(x|θ) until x′ = x
which produces a generation from π(θ|x). Since the
stopping rule is impossible to attain in continuous
settings, the approximation in ABC consists in re-
placing x = x′ with a relaxed condition, d(x, x′) < ǫ,
where d is an arbitrary divergence measure and ǫ is an
approximation parameter to be calibrated.. Assum-
ing that new “observations” x′ from the likelihood
can be easily simulated, this method provides con-
trolled approximations π(θ|d(x, x′) < ǫ) to the pos-
terior distribution. The accuracy of this method can
be calibrated against the available computing power
and it is currently in standard use for genomic ap-
plications (Cornuet et al. 2008) as well as for model
choice in graphical models (Grelaud et al. 2009).10
The field of Bayesian computing is therefore very
much alive and, while its diversity can be construed
as a drawback by some, I do see the emergence of
new computing methods adapted to specific applica-
tions as most promising, because it bears witness to
the growing involvement of new communities of re-
searchers in Bayesian advances.
6 Conclusion
Once again, I want to stress that the purpose of this
essay is far from trying to preach in favour of my
creed, as I do not see Bayesian data analysis as a
philosophical (and even less religious) stance. What
drives my Bayesian choice is the essential practicality
of the tools and of the actions I can undertake thanks
to that choice, as well as the ability to evaluate, crit-
icise, and possibly modify, the calibration choices I
have made at the beginning of my analysis. There
is beauty as well as efficiency in transparency and a
Bayesian data analysis is ultimately transparent in
that it displays all of its components (prior, likeli-
hood, loss function, simulation technique) for public
evaluation. The fact that any of these components
can be replaced by an alternative version explains
illustrates the versatility of the method and the ap-
peal it exerts on non-statisticians in need of a data
analysis tool. The other practical side of Bayesian
data analysis is that we now see a growing range
of complex models where, apart from abdicating on
some part of the complexity, the only available solu-
tion is to use a Bayesian approach. Handling highly
non-identifiable models, inferring about the graphical
structure of a spatial model, running a small area es-
timation on an very dense grid, analysing continuous
time data with hidden Markov structures, all of these
problems and a myriad of others cannot be processed
10(Grelaud et al. 2009) is one illustration of the high popu-
larity of Bayesian techniques in epidemiology, biostatistics and
genomics. I thus disagree with Russell Davidson’s impression
of the opposite at the end of Section 8!
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but from a Bayesian perspective.
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